Schooling, Nation building and Industrialization: a Gellnerian Approach by Hauk, Esther & Ortega, Javier
  
 
 
 
 
 
Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series  
Working Paper nº 825 
 
Schooling, Nation Building, and 
Industrialization: a Gellnerian Approach 
Esther Hauk 
Javier Ortega 
 
May 2015 
Schooling, Nation Building, and Industrialization: a
Gellnerian Approach
Esther Hauky Javier Ortegaz
May 2015
Abstract
We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production be-
tween masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites
to nance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, partic-
ularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide
education (unied schooling) renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively,
schools can be implemented in one region alone (regional education) or the regionally
dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share
the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (secession). We show that
schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not
necesarily socially e¢ cient. Unied schooling is always chosen if the identity of the domi-
nant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock
is su¢ ciently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners
are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of
the region, and this can be socially e¢ cient. The model is shown to be consistent with
evidence for 19th century France and Spain.
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1 Introduction
Political scientists, historians, sociologists and anthropologists have extensively discussed the
issue of the historical genesis of nations and nationalism (see e.g. Smith, 2000, for a summary of
the debate). While perennialistsargue that national identities have existed for a long period
of time (see e.g. Armstrong, 1982, or Hastings, 1997), modernistssituate the birth of nations
and nationalism during industrialization.
In particular, Gellner (1964, 1983) has been very inuential in arguing that both Nations
and Nationalism result from the implementation of mass educational systems to get workers
ready for industrialization. As stated by Breuilly (2006, p. xxxiv), Gellner insisted that
industrialization required or entailed cultural homogenization based on literacy in a standard-
ized vernacular language conveyed by means of state supported mass education. According
to Gellner, industrialization requires a di¤use, universal culture, linking the inhabitants of a
territory to the state. Because workers, through schooling, acquire a common national identity
that enables them to communicate with each other, they also become mobile. In addition, as
mass education is expensive, Gellner (1983) argues that the minimum size for a viable modern
political unit is determined by the ability to nance such an educational system. More recently,
Breuilly (1993) has criticized Gellners theory and other theories of nationalism because they
failed to stress that nationalism is about power and state control, and has argued that the cen-
tral task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power(Breuilly,
1993, p. 1). In addition, Roeder (2007) and Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) argue that nation
building should be understood as resulting from the interaction between central and peripheral
elites.1
We contribute to the literature by developing a theoretical model that explicitly takes into
account the interaction of social groups holding power and relates nation building, schooling
and industrialization à la Gellner.
To this purpose, we model a two-region economy populated by masses and by two elite
groups (landowners and bourgeoisie, as in Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009) who live for two
periods. Regions are heterogeneous in the size of their bourgeoisie. Political power is in the
hands of one of the elite groups, referred to as the dominant group, which is not necessarily
the same at the regional and at the country level. Value is created through bilateral production
between the members of the elites and the members of the masses. Initially, the country is a
rural society, and production takes place only within each region.
The economy is hit by a productivity shock representing an industrialization opportunity
which can raise the productivity of the masses but only if they attend school.2 In that case
1The importance of the power interaction among groups in the genesis of institutions has been extensively
studied in the literature, see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
2There is a debate on whether industrialization caused mass schooling or the other way round. What matters
for our model is that these phenomena go hand in hand. Becker, Hornung and Woesmann (2011) reveals the
importance of formal education for the technological catch-up of Prussia. Galor and Moav (2006) gives historical
evidence for the industrial base for education reforms in the 19th century and reveals the importance of schooling
for at least the second phase of the industrial revolution. At the same time, Allen (2003) argues that the impact
of literacy on growth was limited and Squicciarini and Voigtlaender (2014) shows that knowledge of the elites
(and not literacy) predicts growth in France between 1750 and 1850. For an alternative hypothesis for the
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productivity is raised to a larger extent in the matches with bourgeois than with landowners.3
In addition, schooling is used to create a common identity.4 The set-up of the schooling system
can only be nanced by the elites, but mass members decide whether to attend school, which
forces them to forego production in the rst period.
The politically-dominant elite group decides if and how to implement schooling and how the
costs of schooling are shared within the elite. In particular, the politically-dominant country-
level elite can choose to implement schooling in one region only (regional education) in which
case only within-region production is possible. Alternatively, it can choose to implement schools
in both regions (unied schooling), which creates a common national identity and makes it
possible for the masses of one region to produce with the other regions bourgeoisie. Finally,
we consider the possibility that the dominant region-level elite implements schooling in its own
region but refuses to share the associated costs and benets within the wider country-level
group (secession).
Under all three systems, equilibrium education is shown to be weakly higher when the
bourgeoise dominates, which stems from the higher payo¤s of bourgeois relative to landowners.
However, whenever the dominant group is the same at the country and regional level, the
identity of the dominant group does not matter for the choice of the type of educational sys-
tem. Indeed, in that case, unied schooling is always chosen given its technological advantage.
Specically, a dominant bourgeoisie prefers this system because it can directly benet from the
increase in the pool of matches, while dominant landowners also favor it because the bourgeois
are willing to pay a larger share of the schooling cost under this system.
However, despite this technological advantage, unied schooling can still be dominated by
secession if the dominant elite is not the same regionally and countrywide. In particular, if the
bourgeoisie is regionally-dominant and countrywide-dominated, the size of the cake is larger for
them under unied schooling but at the same time landowners can impose a large share of the
costs on them. In that case, the bourgeoisie chooses secession for intermediate values of the
shock: if the shock is small enough, no schooling is implemented under secession - but unied
schooling might be implemented. In the other extreme, if the shock is large, the size-of-the-cake
e¤ect under unied schooling always dominates. We also show that regionally-dominant and
countrywide-dominated landowners always prefer secession to unied schooling when schooling
under secession is possible, since they can save on educational costs and do not benet from
the regional mobility of the masses.
As for welfare, unied schooling leads to the underprovision of education whenever the gains
from setting up schools for the dominant group are small relative to the gains for the masses,
and particularly so when landowners are dominant, as they benet less from education than the
bourgeois. More interestingly, overeducation can arise if the bourgeoisie is dominant, as this
implementation of mass education systems based on military rivalry see Aghion, Jaravel, Persson, and Rouzet
(2013).
3The same hypothesis is made in Galor et al. (2009). Empirically, Lindert (2004) refers to examples of
resistance of landlords to education in 19th century England and Germany, and Ager (2013) shows that counties
with richer planters before the Civil War invested less in human capital and were less productive in the 20th
century.
4For a formal model of schooling as an instrument for language uniformization, see Ortega and Tangerås
(2008).
3
group chooses in some cases to fully nance education even if this makes the landowners worse-
o¤. Across systems, a social planner always prefers unied schooling over secession whenever
implementing education is socially optimal. Hence only unied schooling or no schooling at all
can be rst best. If instead the central planner can choose the education system but investment
in schooling remains in the hands of the elites, secession can be a second best. Specically, this
arises when a regionally-dominant bourgeoisie implements education under secession while the
country-wide dominant landowners choose not to implement schooling under the unied system.
At the same time, we show that landowner-driven secessions always lower welfare.
We also discuss other forms of heterogeneity across regions and their e¤ects on nation
building and secession. Our results are robust to di¤erences in sizes across the landowners and
masses. However, if productivity shocks are unequally distributed across regions - a case that
seems to be historically relevant - secession becomes more likely as it avoids costly transfers
from the more advanced region to the less advanced region.
Finally, we show that our model can be used to interpret the divergent evolution of France
and Spain in the 19th century. Indeed, despite their common features in terms of income levels
and language heterogeneity at the beginning of the 19th century, France was successful in its
joint nation building/industrialization process through the implementation of a large investment
in education. Instead, both industrialization and nation-building remained weak in Spain, and
peripheral nationalisms developed in Catalonia and the Basque Country. As predicted by our
model, the divergent evolution of these two countries could be related to the di¤erent balance
of power between landowners and bourgeois at the regional and country level: while in France
the bourgeoisie was dominant both in the industrializing regions and at the country level, in
Spain the Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to have a lot of inuence in Spanish politics due to
the dominance of the landowning elites at the country level.
This paper relates to a growing literature that uses modelling or econometric techniques to
study the origin of nations or nation-states. Specically, Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006),
Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) underline the importance
of education for nation-building.5 Alternative mechanisms proposed in the literature as driving
forces for nation-building include the consolidation of a previously existing segment-state
(Roeder, 2007), political centralization prior to modernization (Kroneberg and Wimmer, 2012),
or the homogenization of preferences on public goods (Alesina and Reich, 2013). Empirically,
Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) argues that the origin of nation-states lies on local and regional
factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the basic
model and describe when regional and unied schooling are implementable. In turn, these two
systems are compared in Section 3. After introducing secession as a possible outcome in Section
4, Section 5 studies when secession will be chosen over unied schooling. Next, we study welfare
5Building on Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006)s theory that nationalism often results from the identity
transmitted during the rst implementation of mass schooling, Balcells (2013) argues that French Catalonia
ended up a with a strong French identity because its inhabitants were rst educated at the end of the 19th
century as French patriots. Instead, the lack of investment in education by the Spanish state during the same
period meant that the inhabitants of Spanish Catalonia were educated later from the beginning of the 20th
century- at a time in which Catalan nationalism was developing and was taking initiatives for the education of
masses.
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(Section 6) and extend the model to alternative forms of heterogeneity (Section 7). Finally, in
section 8 we confront the predictions of our model with the cases of 19th century France and
Spain. Section 9 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
We study a country with two regions i = 1; 2. In each region, there are three social groups,
namely the massesM =M1+M2 and the elite which is split into the landowners N = N1+N2
and the bourgeoisie B = B1+B2. Political power is in the hands of one of the elite groups, which
is referred to as the dominantgroup. The dominant group holds power for historical reasons
and is not necessarily the majority elite group. Moreover, while there is one dominant group
at the country level, this group is not necessarily dominant in both regions. Let M > N + B:
We normalize the total size of the elite in the country to N +B = 1. For simplicity, we assume
that both landowners and masses are equally distributed across regions, i.e. N1 = N2 = N2 and
M1 =M2 =
M
2
. Instead, one region is characterized by a larger bourgeoisie than the other, and
this region is assumed to be region 1, without loss of generality (i.e., B1 > B2).
Value is created through bilateral production between members of the elites and members
of the masses. Initially, the country is a rural society. Production takes place only within
each region and the surplus from each match is normalized to 1. The bargaining power of the
masses is given by ; which simply implies in our framework that a member of the masses who
is matched to a member of the elite keeps  of the surplus generated from the match.
This rural society is now hit by a productivity shock representing the industrial revolution.
If the new technology is implemented, the match productivity in the agrarian sector (landowner-
masses) increases to 1 +  while the match productivity in the industrial sector representing
a match between a bourgeois and the masses increases to 1 +  where  > 1. However, the
increase in productivity only occurs if the member of the masses attends school. Otherwise,
the productivity of the match remains equal to 1. In other words, the implementation of the
new technology requires schooling of the masses.
The set-up of a schooling system can only be nanced by the elites, but the masses decide
whether or not to attend school.
There are two periods in our model: in the rst period, the productivity shock is observed
and the schooling decision is made. If schooling is implemented, production takes only place in
the second period. If schooling is not implemented, production takes place in both periods but
the match productivity stays equal to one. All agents have a discount factor of .
2.1 Payo¤s if schools are not implemented
Let 	j (j = B;N;Mi) denote the payo¤ of a member of group j when schooling is not imple-
mented. In this case, any member of the elite produces an output of 1 with each of the M=2
members of the masses living in his region, and gets a proportion 1    of the output. As a
result, the payo¤ of a landowner is the same as that of a bourgeois and is given by
	N = 	B = (1  )(1 + )M
2
. (1)
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For a member of the masses in region i, the pay-o¤ is:
	Mi = (1 + )

N
2
+Bi

(2)
i.e. the member of the masses receives  when producing with the N=2 landowners and Bi
bourgeois in region i.
2.2 Schools
The dominant group chooses whether or not schooling is implemented and how to split the
schooling costs among the elite. We assume that the dominant group cannot force the dominated
group to pay for schooling if with this payment the dominated group would be made worse-o¤
than under no schooling. This implies that the maximum schooling costs that can be imposed on
the dominated elite group leave this group indi¤erent between the implementation of schooling
and the absence of schools.
We also assume that each of the elite groups acts as a single group at the country level,
i.e. each group equally shares across regions the benets from production and the costs from
schooling.
Schools can be implemented either in both regions, or in one region only. The implemen-
tation of schools in both regions creates a common identity across regions, which enables the
masses of each region to produce with the bourgeois from both regions. This is referred to as
nation building or a unied schooling system, and denoted by U . Instead, if schooling is
implemented in one region only, no common identity is created, and thus the masses of each re-
gion can only produce with the bourgeois of the same region. This is referred to as a regional
schooling system, and denoted by Ri (i = 1; 2). In both cases, the masses can only produce
with the landowners of their region of origin.
2.2.1 Payo¤s from schooling
Let kj denote the payo¤s from schooling for group j = B;N;Mi under organizational system
k = U;Ri. Similarly, denote by Ike the cost of setting up schooling system k for a member of the
elite group e = N;B. We can next calculate the benets from schooling for each group under
the di¤erent systems.
When attending school in a unied system, any member of the masses foregoes production
in the rst period and appropriates in the second period (discounted by ) a fraction  of the
amount 1 +  produced with each of the N=2 landowners in his region and the same fraction
of the amount 1 +  produced with each of the B bourgeois in the country:
UMi = 

(1 + )
N
2
+ (1 + )B

i = 1; 2. (3)
Any bourgeois pays IUB schooling set-up costs, and appropriates a fraction 1   of the amount
1 +  produced with the M members of the mass in period 2, i.e.,
UB =  IUB + (1  )(1 + )M . (4)
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The landowners payo¤ depends on its own investment IUN and is associated to a lower match
productivity (1+) and to a smaller pool of mass members than for the bourgeois, namely the
M=2 mass members living in the landowners region:
UN =  IUN + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
. (5)
Under region-i schooling, the payo¤ of any member of the masses in region i is
RiMi = 

(1 + )
N
2
+ (1 + )Bi

i = 1; 2 (6)
where the only di¤erence with (3) is that only within region-i production is possible.
In turn, each of the Bi region-i bourgeois gets (1   )(1 + ) in the second period when
producing with the M=2 educated region-i mass members, while each of the B i bourgeois
in region  i gets (1 + ) with the M=2 uneducated masses of region  i. Then, given cross-
subsidization across regions within the countrywide bourgeoisie, the payo¤ of a bourgeois is
given by the weighted average of these two terms minus the school set-up cost IRiB , i.e.
RiB =  IRiB + (1  ) ((1 + )Bi + (1 + )B i)
M
2B
for i = 1; 2. (7)
Finally, each of the N=2 region-i landowners gets (1   )(1 + ) when producing with the
M=2 educated masses of that region, while each of the N=2 landowners in region  i gets
(1 + )(1   ) when producing with the M=2 uneducated masses of region  i, and thus the
payo¤ of a landowner is:
RiN =  IRiN + (1  ) ( + 1 + 2)
M
4
for i = 1; 2. (8)
2.3 Education thresholds for the elites
In this subsection we study the minimum size of the productivity shock that makes the elite
willing to provide schooling under the assumption that the masses attend school when schools
are built.6
The minimum productivity shock that makes the elite indi¤erent between implementing
unied schooling or not is such that 	e = Ue with e = N;B. From (1), (4), and (5), the
thresholds for the bourgeoisie and the landowners are:
UB =
IUB + (1  )(1  )M2
M(1  ) (9)
UN =
2IUN + (1  )M
(1  )M . (10)
6If the masses have the choice of whether or not to get schooled, we will additionally get a minimum
productivity shock that makes the masses willing to get schooled. In this case, schooling is implemented only if
the productivity shock lies above the maximum of the minimum thresholds by the masses and the elites.
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Similarly, from (1), (7), and (8), the thresholds under region-i schooling are
RiB =
2B
Bi
IRiB + (1  )M
(1  )M for i = 1; 2 (11)
RiN =
4IRiN + (1  )M
(1  )M for i = 1; 2. (12)
All these thresholds depend on how much the elite has to pay for setting up the schools.
We assume the cost of each schooling system to be proportional to the number of students
attending schools and for expositional purposes set marginal schooling costs equal to 1.
The dominant elite group e determines how the costs of education are split within the elite
under education system k. However, the dominant group e cannot force the dominated group
 e to pay for education if this payment makes the dominated group worse-o¤ than under no
schooling. In other words, the dominant group extracts from the dominated their maximum
willingness to pay for education. When the dominant group chooses to implement schooling,
the following cases are possible:
1. Education is su¢ ciently benecial for the dominated to be willing to pay the entire cost
of education. In that case, the dominant group gets education for free.
2. The dominant group has to conance education and pay eIke after forcing the dominated
to pay the maximum acceptable amount Ik e, leaving the dominated indi¤erent between
schooling and no schooling.
3. The dominated are not willing to pay anything for education but the dominant group is
better-o¤ with education even if it pays the full cost.
Which cases will result clearly depends on the productivity shocks. The higher these shocks,
the higher the potential benets from schooling and the higher the potential willingness to pay
for schooling by the dominated group. The following cuto¤s will be relevant for the analysis:
Notation 1 We denote by
 bke the minimum productivity shock making elite group e willing to pay the entire cost of
schooling.
 eke the minimum productivity shock making elite group e willing to conance education
paying eIke when group  e is paying its maximum willingness Ik e:
 ke the minimum productivity shock making elite group e willing to implement education
without paying.
The exact values for these shocks and payments under the di¤erent educational systems
can be found in Table 1 in Appendix A. Lemma 1 shows that two di¤erent rankings of the
thresholds are possible depending on the attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative
to the landowners:
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Lemma 1 For k = U;Ri
1. kB < 
k
N < ekB = ekN < min hbkB; bkNi if 2 > Hk
2. kB < bkB < kN < bkN if 2 < Hk
where Hk is given by
HU = (1  )B (2  1 + ) (13)
HRi = 2(1  ) (  1)Bi (14)
Proof. By simple algebra.
For a given investment in education, the gain from schooling for the bourgeoisie is larger
than for the landowners because the bourgeoisie experiences a larger productivity increase than
landowners and because it is the only group that might gain production partners with schooling.
This explains why kB < 
k
N always holds.
The attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners is particu-
larly high when (i)  is very high, i.e. the bourgeoisie has a big productivity advantage over
landowners, (ii) the agents discount the future to a small extent, as the future gains for school-
ing are higher for the bourgeoisie than for the landowners, and (iii) the size of the bourgeoisie
is large, as the per capita burden from education for a bourgeois is then reduced. For this rea-
son, when Hk > 2 is satised, the thresholds of the landowners are systematically larger than
the thresholds of the bourgeoisie, and, in particular, bkB < kN holds, i.e. there are situations
(specically, for bkB <  < kN) in which the bourgeoisie is willing to set-up schools bearing
the full cost while schooling for free is still not benecial for landowners.7 Instead, for Hk < 2,
the attractiveness of education is more similar for both groups, and bkB > kN . In this case,
the bourgeoisies threshold for full education nancing bkB might be bigger than the threshold
for landowners bkN despite the extra gains from schooling for the bourgeoisie. This happens in
particular if the bourgeoisie is small relative to the landowners, as in that case the per bourgeois
cost of education is high.
Within groups, the payo¤ from schooling for a given elite group in a given schooling system
k is decreasing in the amount paid by the group.
2.4 Provision of education by the elite
We are now in a position to represent the decision on education provision by the elite under
the assumption that the masses have to follow suit8 in a given organizational form k.9
7In this case the cuto¤s for co-nancing schooling are irrelevant and therefore do not appear in the second
case of Lemma 1.
8Whether or not the masses want to follow suit will be analyzed in Subsection 2.5.
9We will see later on that this analysis also applies to secession (Section 4)
9
2.4.1 Bourgeoisie dominant
Figure 1 represents the decision on education provision by the elites when the bourgeoisie is
dominant and Hk < 2. For  > bkN the landowners are willing to pay the full cost of education,
and thus the bourgeoisie puts the full burden on them. For fkN = fkB <  < bkN , the bourgeoisie
can only impose part of the investment on the landowners, namely IkN  0 and has to nance
the rest of the payment fIkB. Instead, for  < fkN = fkB education is not provided by the elites.
In turn, Figure 2 represents the outcome for Hk > 2, a situation in which the payo¤s from
education for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners are particularly high. In this case,
the elite is willing to provide education if and only if  > bkB: The main di¤erence with the
preceding case is that for bkB <  < kN , the bourgeoisie is willing to provide education even
if it has the bear the full burden. In addition, in this area, the landowners become actually
worse-o¤ after the implementation of education.
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2.4.2 Landowners dominant
Figure 3 represents the case where the landowners are dominant and Hk < 2. In this case, the
elite is willing to provide education if and only if  > ekN . This provision is fully nanced by
the bourgeoisie if  > bkB and partially nanced by each group otherwise, i.e. the payments arefIkN and IkB for respectively landowners and bourgeois.
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For Hk > 2, education is provided if and only if  > kN and always fully funded by the
bourgeoisie.
A simple look at the gures reveals that for Hk < 2 the elite agrees when to provide
education (Figures 1 and 3). However, for Hk > 2 (Figures 2 and 4), the bourgeoisie is willing
to fully nance education when the landowners do not even want education (bkB < kN), hence
12
the bourgeoisie will provide education earlier than the landowners if the masses follow suit. We
next study whether the masses want to follow suit and get schooled voluntarily.
2.5 School attendance by the masses
The masses of region i are willing to get educated whenever the payo¤s from schooling are higher
than the payo¤s from no-schooling, i.e. Mi  	Mi. Equalizing (2) and (3), the productivity
threshold determining whether region-i masses attend schools under unied schooling is:
UMi =
1

  2 (B  Bi + B i)
 (N + 2B)
for i = 1; 2. (15)
Similarly, from (2) and (6), the threshold for region-i schooling is:
RiMi =
1

  2Bi (  1)
 (N + 2Bi)
for i = 1; 2: (16)
It is easy to show that, due to the increased match pool, the masses from each region are
willing to get schooled earlier under unied than under regional schooling, i.e. RiMi > 
U
Mi
for
i = 1; 2.
At the same time, from both (15) and (16), it appears that the masses of i and  i do
not exhibit the same willingness to attend school even within a given educational system.
Specically, the masses of the region with a larger bourgeoisie have a higher productivity cuto¤
under unied schooling and instead a lower cuto¤under regional schooling, i.e., it can be shown
that UM1 > 
U
M2
, R1M1 < R2M2 , B1 > B2. The underlying intuition is as follows: under unied
schooling, the masses can get matched to the bourgeoisie of both regions, and hence the increase
in the match pool is larger for the masses belonging to the region with a smaller bourgeoisie,
which explains why they are willing to get schooled sooner. Instead, under regional schooling,
the match pool is unchanged after education and thus the productivity gain stemming from
schooling is larger for those masses which have already access to a larger bourgeoisie.
Since unied schooling requires the masses of both regions to be willing to get educated, the
cuto¤ of the masses that are less willing to get schooled, namely the masses of region 1, UM1
determines when unied schooling is feasible for the masses. In addition, given that UM1 < 
R1
M1
,
regional education of the masses is never possible before unied schooling.
2.6 Equilibrium education
Lemma 2 shows that the incentives of the masses are irrelevant for the implementation of
schooling:
Lemma 2 Education always pays o¤ for the masses when it does for the elite.
Proof. See appendix B.
It is easy to understand why schools benet the masses more than landowners even when
the latter do not have to pay for setting up the schools: both groups require that their rst
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period production loss due to schooling is o¤set by their gain due to higher productivity in the
second period. While this productivity gain is the same for both groups when a member of
the masses is matched to a landowner, a member of the masses might also be matched to a
bourgeois granting him an even higher rise in productivity. In addition, under unied schooling,
this advantage for a member of the masses is amplied by the possibility to be matched with
a member of the bourgeoisie in both regions.
A parallel argument runs for the incentives of the bourgeois relative to those of the masses.
Indeed, on the one hand, a match between a bourgeois and a mass member is the most pro-
ductive match and the prospect for a mass member to be matched with some probability to a
landowner puts initially its productivity threshold above that of the bourgeois. However, for
such low productivity shocks, the landowners are not willing to nance schooling, and hence the
bourgeoisie has to fully nance the setup of schools, which pushes their minimum productivity
shock above the cuto¤ of the masses. Therefore, the incentives of the elites alone determine
the implementation of schooling.
Proposition 1 For Hk < 2 schooling is implemented for  > eke independently of the identity
of the dominant group. For Hk > 2 schooling is implemented earlier (specically, for  > bkB)
when the bourgeoisie is dominant than when landowners are dominant (implemented for  >
kN > bkB).
Proof. Follows directly from the analysis in Section 2.4. B and Lemma 2.
We now discuss how the implementation of schooling varies with the underlying parameters.
When Hk < 2 the interests of both elite groups coincide. The cuto¤ for schooling to be
implemented eke is decreasing in  and B (or Bi respectively) and increasing in .10 A higher
productivity advantage of the bourgeoisie  makes schooling more protable for the bourgeoisie
reducing its threshold to implement schooling when dominant. But the threshold is also lower
when landowners are dominant since they can make the bourgeoisie pay a larger amount of the
schooling costs. Similarly, since the match productivity of the bourgeoisie increases more than
that of landowners if the masses are schooled, an increase in the size of the bourgeoisie makes
schooling more attractive. Finally, a higher share of the match productivity for the masses 
raises the cuto¤ for schooling as the elites get a smaller piece of the cake in that case.11
For Hk > 2 the implementation of schooling depends on the identity of the dominant group
when kN >  > bkB. Landowners do not benet from schooling and will not implement schools
if dominant while the bourgeoisie benets that much that it is willing to fully nance schools
if it is in a position to do so. Again, the cuto¤ for a dominant elite to implement education bkB
is decreasing in  and and B (or Bi respectively) and increasing in .12
10This can be shown by simple algebra.
11In this sense, in our model higher pre-industrial wages make early industrialization unlikely when the new
technology is still fairly ine¢ cient while elite groups who face lower pre-industrial wages might already implement
industrialization.
12The threshold for dominant landowners kN is independent of these parameters: they never have to co-nance
education (therefore the cuto¤ is independent of ) and hence are willing to implement schooling when the second
period productivity gain due to the technological advantage outweighs the cost of the loss of production in the
rst period. Since they get the same share of both the loss and the productivity gain, the cuto¤ is independent
of .
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So far we have taken the potential educational system as given. Next, we turn to the choice
of the education system by the dominant elite.
3 Unied vs. Region-i education
Under regional education, either region-1 or region-2 might become educated. The thresholds
of all groups to get educated are weakly lower under region-1 than under region-2 education.
Moreover, HR1 > HR2. Therefore
Lemma 3 The dominant elite always prefer region 1 schooling to region 2 schooling.
Proof. See appendix C.
The intuition for this is simple: as the size of the landowners is the same in both regions, the
productivity gains are larger when the masses with the larger bourgeoisie get educated. The
bourgeoisie prefers this option as the return will be larger, and dominant landowners prefer it
because it enables them to extract a larger payment from the bourgeois.
However, unied schooling is even better: the cost-savings of sending only one region to
school do not outweigh the benets from higher productivity in both regions and the increased
match pool, as shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The dominant elite always prefers unied schooling to region i schooling.
Proof. See appendix C.
It is easy to see that regional schooling in both regions is also dominated by unied schooling.
Schooling both regions costs the same as unied schooling, but there is no regional mobility
and hence the bourgeoisie loses out on the increased match pool across regions.
4 Secession
So far, we have assumed the existence of inter-regional transfers within elite groups leading to
a perfect equalization of payo¤s across regions within elite groups. In this section, we study
whether the region-i dominant elite has actually incentives to avoid such redistribution by
accompanying the implementation of schooling in region i by the political secession of this
region. We assume that after region-i secession, no cross-border production can take place.
Since there are no interregional matches after secession, the cuto¤s for the masses to be
willing to go to school under region-i secession (denoted by Si) are the same than under regional
education, i.e. S1M1 = 
R1
M1
< S2M2 = 
R2
M2
. Instead, region-i bourgeoisies payo¤ from schooling
with secession is
SiBi =  ISiBi + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
(17)
i.e., the region-i bourgeoisie invests ISiBi in the set-up of schools in its region and gets the
proceeds from the future high-productivity matches with region-i masses. Similarly, the payo¤
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from region-i secession for region-i landowners is:
SiNi =  ISiNi + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
: (18)
Equalizing (17) and (18) to (1), the productivity thresholds for the implementation of schooling
with region-i secession for respectively region-i bourgeois and landowners are:
SiBi =
2ISiBi
(1  )M +
1

(19)
SiNi =
2ISiNi
(1  )M +
1

. (20)
Following the same steps as in section 2.3 and taking into account that educational costs are
only paid by the regional elite, Table 1 in appendix A displays the cuto¤s for free education,
full payment and partial payment, together with the corresponding educational costs under
Si. It turns out that while educational costs di¤er, the cuto¤s are the same as under regional
schooling. Therefore Lemma 1 extends also to k = Si with HSi = HRi and again we have two
possible regimes depending on the protability of schooling for the bourgeois relative to the
landowners.
5 Secession versus unied schooling
We next study the choice between secession and unied schooling. For landowners, combining
(5) and (18), we obtain that
SiNi  UN , ISiNi  IUN (21)
i.e. landowners will simply go for the cheapest system in terms of investment, because they
do not benet from the extra cross-regional matches generated under unied schooling. This
implies in particular that if they are to fully nance education under both systems, they will be
indi¤erent between the two schooling systems as secession halves the number of mass members
to be educated but also the number of landowners nancing education, i.e. ISiNi =
M=2
N=2
= IUN =
M
N
.
Instead, secession compared to unied schooling restricts the number of matches for the
bourgeois, which implies that secession will be preferred by the bourgeois only if it generates a
su¢ ciently large reduction in costs. Note however that, as for landowners, the relevant cost is
not the total expenditure in schooling, but the expenditure per member of the bourgeoisie: when
going from unied schooling to region-i secession, the number of bourgeois nancing education
falls from B to Bi, which implies that the cost per bourgeois will not fall a lot unless Bi is
very big. Mathematically, from (4) and (17), the condition under which secession is preferred
is given by:
SiBi  UB , IUB   ISiBi  (1 + )(1  )
M
2
. (22)
Clearly, as the costs of education are crucial in the secession decision and these costs partly
depend on the identity of the dominant group, the choice between these two systems is likely to
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depend on the identity of the dominant group at the country and regional level. Subsections 5.1
and 5.2 study the equilibrium when respectively the bourgeoisie and landowners are dominant
both at the country and regional level, while subsections 5.3 and 5.4 consider in turn the two
cases in which the identity of the dominant group at the country and regional level is not the
same.
5.1 Bourgeoisie always dominant
Proposition 2 shows that for a bourgeoisie dominant both at the regional and country level, cost
saving from secession is never su¢ cient to o¤set the associated forgone productive matches.
Proposition 2 A regionally and countrywide dominant bourgeoisie always prefers unied school-
ing to secession.
Proof. See Appendix D.1
In order to provide intuition for this result, Figure 5 compares for one of the three possible
parameter congurations (2 < HSi < HU) the payo¤s from schooling under unied education
(dashed line) and secession (continuous line) for the bourgeois and the landowners. For high
enough productivity levels ( > bUN), the landowners are willing to pay for the entire cost of
education under both systems, and thus the bourgeois choose unied schooling as the additional
matches under unied schooling can be obtained at no extra cost. In turn, for kN <  < bUN , the
landowners are willing to pay the same amount of cost (per mass member) under both systems,
and the rest needs to be paid for by the bourgeois. Then, as unied schooling is characterized by
a larger set of matches for the bourgeois, the bourgeoispayo¤s after the payment of these costs
is higher under unied schooling. For lower productivity values (bSiBi <  < kN), landowners are
not anymore willing to contribute to education as this would make them worse-o¤, but bourgeois
still implement schooling under both systems paying the full cost. Unied schooling is always
preferred as the potential saving in terms of set-up cost stemming from secession occurring
only when the seceding region has a large bourgeoisie- is never su¢ cient to compensate for the
loss of matches. Finally, for bUB <  < bSiBi schools are set up only under unied schooling, and
so the bourgeoisie favours this system.13
13The two other parameter specications are similar, except that there is no parameter area in which full
payment by the bourgeoisie simultaneously arises as an equilibrium under both systems, and there is instead
a situation in which partial payment by the bourgeoisie under unied schooling arises at the same time as no
schooling under secession.
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5.2 Landowners dominant always
As the payo¤ from schooling to landowners is the same under both systems, dominant landown-
ers simply choose the system that allows them to transfer a larger share of the cost of schooling
to the bourgeois. As the bourgeoisie benets more from schooling under unied education, the
bourgeoisie is willing to pay a larger share of the cost under this system, and landowners will
always weakly prefer unied schooling to secession:
Proposition 3 Regionally and countrywide dominant landowners always weakly prefer unied
schooling to secession.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
Specically, for high enough productivity levels, the bourgeoisie is willing to fully nance
education under both systems, in which case landowners are indi¤erent between them. However,
for intermediate productivity levels, full or even partial nancing is only possible under unied
schooling, and landowners will choose unied schooling for that reason.
5.3 Region-i-dominant but countrywide-dominated bourgeoisie
If the landowners are dominant at the country level but the bourgeoisie is dominant in region i,
the bourgeoisie might want region i to separate. Specically, the trade-o¤ facing the bourgeoisie
is as follows: on the one hand, if unied schooling can be implemented, secession leads to the
loss of valuable match partners in region  i (a loss that is increasing in ). On the other, the
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bourgeoisie can shift educational costs to the landowners under secession while it bears most
of the costs under unied schooling as it is dominated by the landowners under that system.
Hence if secession stands a chance against unied schooling, it has to be for relatively low
productivity shocks otherwise, the loss of potential partners would be too costly- but still
high enough for education under secession to be protable for the bourgeoisie. This intuition
is conrmed in Proposition 4 which characterizes the equilibrium outcome since the masses are
willing to get educated whenever the elite is willing to implement education.
Proposition 4 A region-i dominant but country-level-dominated bourgeoisie chooses region-
i secession if and only if (i) schooling is implemented under secession but not under unied
schooling, or (ii) the productivity shock  takes intermediate values and some further conditions
are satised (see Appendix D.2.1 for the specic values and conditions).
Proof. See Appendix D.2.1
Part (i) in the proposition applies when schooling under secession is so benecial for the
regionally dominant bourgeoisie that it is protable for them to implement it even when paying
the full cost schooling. Instead, the landowners are made worse o¤ by schooling and for this
reason they choose not to implement schooling if they dominate under unied schooling.14 How-
ever, once unied schooling becomes implementable, the bourgeoisie prefers being dominated
under unied schooling over being dominant under secession due to the increased match pool
under unied schooling.
As for Part (ii), Figure 6 illustrates one case where there exists a range of intermediate
productivity shocks for which region-i bourgeoisie favours secession.15 Indeed for low enough
productivity levels, unied schooling is preferred either because schooling is simply not prof-
itable under secession (for eUB <  < eSiBi) or because landownerswillingness to pay under
secession is limited (for eSiB <  < aa2).16 Symmetrically, for high enough productivity levels
( > a),17 unied schooling dominates as the gain associated to having additional production
partners is very high. Instead, for intermediate values (aa2 <  < a), region-i bourgeoisie
chooses to secede because it has to pay little for education under secession compared to unied
schooling (IUB = I
U while ISiB is either small or zero) and this actually outweighs the higher
production under unied schooling.
14This happens for 2 < HSi when dSiBi <  < N .
15This case holds when 2 > HSi > HU , Bi < N2 and bUB < eSiB are simultaneously veried.
16As shown in Appendix D.2.1 the cuto¤ aa2 is dened by UB
 
IUB =
M
B

= SBi(I
Si
Bi
= fISiBi):
17As shown in Appendix D.2.1 the cuto¤ a is dened by UB
 
IUB =
M
B

= SBi(I
Si
Bi
= 0).
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More generally, the specic range of intermediate productivity shocks for which secession is
chosen depends on the size of region-i bourgeoisie. Indeed, while only half of the masses get
educated under secession, the associated per bourgeois cost is smaller the larger the bourgeoisie
of the seceding region. Other parameters which make the results case specic are the regional
size of the bourgeoisie compared to the landowners since the bourgeoisie shifts educational
costs to the landowners- and the productivity advantage of the bourgeoisie.
While the bourgeoisie might prefer secession, the landowners never prefer to be dominated
under secession to being dominant under unied education. Indeed, as discussed above, from
the landownersviewpoint, the only di¤erence between the two systems are the educational
costs and these are always higher under secession.
5.4 Region-i-dominant but countrywide-dominated bourgeoisie
Since the landowners do not benet from regional mobility, they prefer secession whenever their
educational costs under secession are lower than under unied education. This indeed happens
if landowners are dominated at the country level but dominant in region i.
Proposition 5 Region-i dominant but countrywide-dominated landowners always prefer region-
i secession whenever education is implementable under secession. Hence only for productivity
shocks for which unied education is implementable but education under secession is not, do we
observe unied education.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.2.
The landowners prefer secession because they are the dominant group under secession and
therefore can shift (part of) the educational costs to the bourgeoisie and hence implement
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schooling paying less than they would under the unied system where they are the main bearers
of the educational cost.18
We are now in a position to summarize our results. Secession can only be an equilibrium
outcome if it implies a change in the dominant group. It will always result when education under
secession is implementable and the landowners are dominant under secession but dominated at
the country level. If it is the bourgeoisie that is dominant under secession but dominated at
the country level, secession might occur only for intermediate productivity shocks. In the latter
case it will also occur when schooling under secession is implementable and fully nanced by
the dominant bourgeoisie while unied schooling does not occur since the landowners are worse
o¤ under schooling.
We next study the welfare properties of the equilibria.
6 Welfare
The value of welfare in our model is obtained by adding up individual utility levels. In the
absence of schooling, welfare is given by
WNS =
M
2
	Mi +
M
2
	M i +B	B +N	N ;
which using (1) and (2) simplies to:
WNS =
M
2
(1 + ), (23)
i.e. in every period elite members are matched to the masses of their region and produce one
unit of output. How the production is split is a simple transfer from one group to the other
and for this reason does not enter the expression.
Under unied schooling, welfare becomes:
WU =
M
2
UMi +
M
2
UM i +B
U
B +N
U
N ;
which simplies to
WU =  M +

(1 + )
N
2
+ (1 + )B

M (24)
using (3), (4), and (5). The direct cost of unied schooling is M , as all mass members get
educated. As for the benets, productivity is now higher (1 +  and 1 +  in the matches
with respectively landowners and bourgeois) and the masses can now produce with the entire
bourgeoisie. However, no production takes place in the rst period as the masses are attending
school during that period.
18The bourgeoisie never prefers being dominated under secession to being dominant under unied schooling
as secession implies it loses valuable match partners and in addition in this case the bourgeoisie becomes the
main bearer of educational costs under secession.
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The social planner prefers unied schooling to no schooling if and only if WU > WNS or
equivalently when
 > UW =
2 B (2+    1)
 (N + 2B)
+
1

(25)
This cuto¤ (25) decreases in , B and  as schooling is more benecial the more the future
matters, the bigger the bourgeoisie, and the higher the productivity gains.
Next, we study the e¢ cient educational level under regional schooling and secession. Clearly,
as the planner maximizes utilitarian welfare and the payo¤s of the agents are linear, distribu-
tional issues are irrelevant, and the implementation of schooling in one region and the secession
of that region are indistinguishable from a welfare viewpoint. If region i is the only region that
gets educated, welfare under secession or regional schooling is given by
WRiSi =
M
2
RiMi +
M
2
	M i +B
Ri
B +N
Ri
N ,
which simplies to
WRiSi =  M
2
+
M
2
(1 + )

B i +
N
2

+ 
M
2

N
2
(1 + ) +Bi(1 + )

: (26)
the direct cost of education is now given by M
2
, while one unit of the good is produced in each
period by each of the M
2
members of the masses in region  i with the regional elite B i+ N2 and
production in region i is conned to the second period but with a higher productivity (1 + 
with the landowners and 1 +  with the bourgeois).
Subtracting (23) from (26), the planner prefers education in one region to no education if
and only if:
 > RiSiW =
1 +Bi +
N
2

 
Bi +
N
2
 . (27)
6.1 E¢ ciency of equilibrium education
Proposition 6 checks whether the implementation of unied schooling in the decentralized equi-
librium is socially e¢ cient:
Proposition 6 The equilibrium education level under unied schooling can be socially ine¢ -
cient. Undereducation arises under a wide set of parameters, while overeducation can arise only
if the bourgeoisie is dominant, the payo¤s from schooling for the bourgeoisie are high relative
to the payo¤s of the landowners and the productivity takes intermediate values as specied in
Appendix E.2.
Proof. See Appendix E.2
The main intuition behind the ine¢ cient provision of unied schooling is simply that the
politically dominant elite does not internalize the benets from schooling for the other elite and
for the masses. More specically, the solid line in Figure 7 represents the socially e¢ cient pro-
ductivity threshold (UW ) for the provision of education for di¤erent values of the productivity
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advantage in matches involving the bourgeoisie () while the dashed (resp. dotted) line repre-
sents the equilibrium threshold under unied schooling when the bourgeoisie (resp. landowners)
are the dominant group.19
Equilibrium education under the unied system is e¢ cient no matter the identity of the
dominant group in area I (no education) and area V (education), while in area IV the e¢ cient
choice is made only if the bourgeoisie is the dominant group. In area II, education is e¢ cient,
but is never implemented because the bourgeois do not take into account the gains education
generates for landowners. Instead, in area III there is actually overeducation under unied
schooling if the bourgeoisie dominates. Specically, the bourgeois fully nance education and
make landowners worse-o¤ than under no education as the productivity gain for landowners is
too low to cover for the loss of rst period production while the masses take education. As this
loss is not internalized by the bourgeois, the equilibrium is characterized by excess education.
The same type of argument holds regarding the e¢ ciency of decentralized education under
region-i schooling or secession, but overeducation arises only for values of the bourgeoisies
productivity advantage () higher than under unied schooling because the bourgeoisie does
not gain production partners under these systems. Figure A1 in the appendix provides an
example of these di¤erent cases.
6.2 First best
Assume rst that the planner is able to enforce the welfare maximizing schooling level under each
system.20 In that case, the planner prefers unied schooling over regional schooling/secession if
19We have assumed that  = 0:1,  = 0:95, B1 = 0:25, B = 0:4, and M = 2. The threshold for a dominant
bourgeoisie (dashed line) is given by eUB for HU < 2 and by bUB for HU > 2 and the threshold for landowners
(dotted line) by eUB for HU < 2 and by NU for HU > 2 (see Figures 1 to 4).
20As it is easy to show that UM2 < 
U
M1
< UW and 
Ri
Mi
= SiMi < 
RiSi
W for i = 1; 2, the masses are always
willing to attend school whenever the central planner wants this to be the case.
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and only if WU > WRiSi 8i = 1; 2: As it is easy to show that WR1S1 > WR2S2,21 the condition
becomes WU > WR1S1, which from (24) and (26) is equivalent to:


N
2
+ B2

M
2
 + (1 + )B
M
2
 >
M
2
+
M
2

B2 +
N
2

. (28)
The social planner implements unied schooling whenever the additional returns from education
in this system compared to regional schooling/secession (LHS of (28)) outweigh the additional
costs of unied schooling (RHS). Specically, the additional returns come from the higher
productivity 
 
N
2
+ B2

M
2
 of the now-educated region-2masses in their matches with region-
2 elites and also from the additional matches the unied system enables, namely the inter-
regional production between the masses of region i and the bourgeois of region  i (for i = 1; 2),
i.e. (1 + )BM
2
. In turn, unied schooling is more costly because it educates M
2
additional
mass members, and also because region-2 masses do not produce anymore in the rst period
M
2
 
B2 +
N
2

as they are attending school.
Clearly, for su¢ ciently high values of  and/or  in (28), the planner will choose unied
schooling. The question then remains whether the planner may choose region-i schooling when
the returns from education are su¢ ciently low. Proposition 7 shows that this will never be
the case, because welfare under region-i schooling is higher than welfare under the unied
system only when implementing schooling is actually ine¢ cient. Intuitively, in that case, given
that education is ine¢ cient, implementing it a lower scale (region-i schooling) is better than
implementing it at a higher scale (unied schooling). However, as the planner has always the
possibility of not implementing school at all, implementing region-i schooling is never a rst
best outcome:
Proposition 7 Under centralization, unied schooling yields higher welfare than regional school-
ing and secession.
Proof. See appendix E.1
6.3 Second best
In general, the central planner will not be able to control the school set-up investments made by
landowners and bourgeois. If the elites are willing to nance unied schooling, this system will
still be chosen by the central planner. However, if the elites are not willing to implement that
system and they are instead willing to implement regional schooling or secession, the central
planner may prefer this option if for the corresponding parameter area education in one region
is socially better than no education.
21Indeed, the planner prefers the implementation of schooling in the region with the larger bourgeoisie (region
1) because (i) the cost of schooling is the same in both regions given that the size of the masses is identical, and
(ii) education increases more the productivity of matches with the bourgeoisie, and thus the productivity gains
from education are higher for those masses with access to a larger bourgeoisie. Mathematically,WR1S1 > WR2S2
holds if  > 1 = 
Ri
B , which is always satised.
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From Propositions 2 and 3, we know that if the identity of the dominant group is the same
countrywide and regionally, the dominant group always chooses unied schooling, which implies
that regional schooling/secession can never be a second best in that case.
Consider next the case where the bourgeoisie is dominant at the country level but landowners
are dominant at the regional level. From Proposition 5, landowners always prefer secession
when both unied education and secession are implementable and in addition unied schooling
is always implementable when education under secession is. As the central planner always
prefers unied schooling when implementable, this means that any landowner-driven secession
lowers welfare.
Finally, consider a regionally-dominant but countrywide-dominated bourgeoisie. In this
case, we know from Proposition 4 that for HSi > 2 and bSiBi <  < N schooling is implemented
under secession but not under the unied system. This is not however a su¢ cient condition for
secession to be a second best, because secession has still to be e¢ cient, i.e. socially better than
no-schooling. This condition does not automatically hold and requires the cut-o¤ for e¢ cient
education in one region (RiSiW ) to be lower than the minimum productivity level rendering
schooling protable for the landowners, i.e. N = 1 . This result is summarized in the following
proposition:22
Proposition 8 If a regionally-dominant bourgeoisie wishes to implement secession when the
countrywide-dominant landowners do not want to implement unied schooling (HSi > 2 andbSiBi <  < N), secession is a second best if an only if max[RiSiW ; bSiBi ] < .
Proof. See Appendix E.4
7 Robustness
The above results are derived assuming one cross-regional dimension of heterogeneity, namely
the size of the bourgeoisie. In this section we briey discuss other forms of heterogeneity.
As before we assume that the regions are identical except in one dimension. Specically, we
consider in turn cross-regional heterogeneity in the number of mass members, the number of
landowners, or the date of the industrialization opportunity.
If the heterogeneity stems from the size of the masses, the minimum productivity shock
necessary for the masses to be willing to get region i schooling or unied schooling becomes
identical across regions. As before, the masses are willing to attend unied schools whenever
they are willing to attend regional schools. Under region i education the elite of the region
with the larger masses benets more from education, but educating this region is also more
costly since more individuals have to be schooled. Unied schooling then leads to less than
double education costs and big benets due to the mobility of the masses. This leads to nation
building for su¢ ciently high productivity shocks and makes secession less likely than in our
benchmark setting.
22In Appendix E.5 we provide one numerical example for which the secession of a regionally-dominated
bourgeoisie is a second best, and one in which this outcome is worse than no-schooling.
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It is easy to see that our results are robust to the case when it is the size of the landowners
that di¤ers across regions. The main di¤erence to the benchmark model is that now the cuto¤s
for education (might) depend on the size of the regional landowners and no longer on the size of
the regional bourgeoisie. Now the masses in the region with the smaller group of landowners are
willing to get educated earlier in each educational system since they face a smaller probability
to meet a landowner and are therefore are more likely to be matched with a bourgeois and enjoy
the additional productivity increase of this type of match. Nevertheless, the masses are still
willing to get education in the unied system before they are willing to get educated regionally
or under secession. Moreover, as before, the masses are still willing to get educated whenever
the elite is willing to implement education. Hence, the education incentives of the elite alone
determine when schooling is implemented. They face the same type of trade-o¤s than before,
and hence the results are qualitatively the same.
Finally, consider a case where only region i experiences a large industrialization shock, and
as a result only the agents in that region can initially access the high technology. If attain-
ing a high productivity in cross-regional matches requires only one of the agents bourgeois
or mass members- to have access to that technology, our results on the equilibrium and op-
timality of unied schooling still carry on. This is also the case if unied schooling creates
a common identity that allows mass members to migrate across regions, following Gellner
(1983). Instead, if migration is not possible and high productivity in cross-regional matches
requires both the bourgeoisie to access the new technology and the masses to be trained for
it, asymmetric industrialization shocks across regions hinder nation building and originate an
additional channel leading to secession at equilibrium.23 Indeed, in that case, regional schooling
in the high-productivity region is more attractive for all groups than regional schooling in the
low-productivity region. Moreover, the bigger the relative di¤erence across regions, the more
likely it is that regional education dominates unied schooling. In addition, since transfers
to the less e¢ cient region can be avoided by implementing secession, a very unequal speed of
industrialization makes nation building across both regions impossible and is likely to lead to
secession.
8 Case Study: Spain versus France
In this section, we relate our model to the cases of 19th century France and Spain. At the
beginning of the 19th century, both countries were similar at least along some characteristics
relevant to our model.
Specically, both countries had a very similar per capita GDP at the beginning of the
century24 and were characterized by a heterogeneous language composition. Indeed, in 1794 only
about 40% of the French population were native French speakers25 (Calvet 2002, p. 218), while
an important proportion of the Spanish population had a language other than Spanish/Castilian
23In the model this could be represented by di¤erent i or by di¤erent i.
24According to Tortella (1994, p. 2) Spains per capita GDP was 2% higher than Frances in 1800, and 7%
lower in 1820. According to Maddison (2003, pp. 58-67), Frances GDP was higher by 11% in 1820.
25Among the other language groups, the largest was Occitan and next came Breton and Alsacian. Additionally,
small minorities were speaking Franco-provençal, Basque, Catalan, Corsican, or Flemish.
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(i.e. Catalan, Galician, Basque, or Bable) as their mothertongue in 1787.26 Another common
characteristic is that the rst industries were geographically concentrated. In France, the rst
industries were mostly concentrated in the North-East (Crayen and Baten, 2010), and in the
case of Spain they were mostly concentrated in Catalonia and in the Basque Country (Tortella,
2000).
Despite these common features, France and Spain ended up having very di¤erent outcomes
in terms of industrialization, with Frances per capita GDP becoming 1.7 times that of Spain
in 1930.27 The outcomes were also very di¤erent in terms of nation-building. In the historical
literature, France is often used as a benchmark of successful nation-building (see e.g. Kroneberg
and Wimmer, 2012) while Spain is seen as an example of an unaccomplished nation-building
process accompanied with the emergence of peripheral nationalisms (see e.g. Linz, 1974, 1975;
Keating, 1993). When elections were held, peripheral nationalist parties were systematically
represented in the Spanish Parliament since the end of the 19th century. Instead, the success (or
even the existence) of regionalist/nationalist parties in Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, or the French
parts of the Basque Country or Catalonia has been extremely limited. For instance, in the
June 1931 Spanish legislative elections, the Catalan nationalist parties obtained almost three
fourths of the Catalan constituencies, and their Galician regionalist and Basque nationalist
counterparts respectively 40 per cent and one third of the Galician and Basque constituencies
(see Tusell, 1982).28 In contrast, in the rst round of the April 1928 French legislative elections,
regionalist candidates were only present in Alsace and obtained 4 seats with 15.9% of the votes:
overall, the French Parliament consisted of 4 regionalist deputies out of 612 (see Lachapelle,
1928).
In terms of our model, we can consider that the two regions characterizing France are the
industrializing North-East and the agricultural South-West, as dened for instance by the St-
Malo-Geneva line identied by some Historians (see e.g. Weber, 1976). In addition, it is
safe to assume that the bourgeoisie was the dominant elite both in the North-East and at the
French level as a whole. Indeed, Price (2004) argues that while the landowners retained an
important amount of power at least until 1870, Newwealth was represented by a grande
26There are no available data on the language composition of Spain at the end of the 18th century. However,
one can do a back of the envelope computation to get an upper bound for the proportion of non-Spanish
speakers. According to Linz (1975), historically Spanish has also been spoken by part of the population in those
regions where Catalan, Galician, or Basque were also spoken. Instead, these three languages were geographically
concentrated in certain provinces (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida, Girona, Valencia, Castellon, Alicante, and the
Balearic Islands, for Catalan; A Coruna, Lugo, Ourense, and Pontevedra, for Galician; and Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia,
Araba, and Navarre for Basque). Using data on the population of provinces in the 1787 Census (INE, 1991),
an upper bound for the proportion of Catalan, Galician, Basque, and Bable speakers is respectively 18%, 13%,
5%, and 3%, and thus a lower bound for the proportion of Spanish speakers is 61%.
27Measured in 1970 U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity, the GDP per capita of France in 1930
was 1,337 and that of Spain 798 (Tortella, 1994, p.2). Similar results are found in Maddison (2003, pp. 62
& 68): measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, Frances per capita GDP was 4,532 and Spains
2,620.
28In Catalonia, out of 53 seats, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya obtained 31 seats, the Lliga Regionalista
3, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya 2, the Partit Català Republicà 1, and the Esquerra Catalana Radical-
Socialista 2. In Galicia, out of 47 seats, the Federación Republicana Gallega obtained 14, the Galleguistas 2,
and the Regionalistas 1. In the Basque Country (excluding Navarre), out of 24 seats, the Partido Nacionalista
Vasco obtained 8 seats.
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bourgeoisie, which had, since 1830, achieved dominance not only in commerce, industry, and
the professions but also in government (Price, 2004, p. 37). As the bourgeoisie is dominant
both at the regional and at the country level, from Proposition 2 we expect the bourgeoisie to
choose unied schooling, which in turns results in the creation of a common French identity.
The implementation of schooling throughout the country and the creation of a strong com-
mon French identity were actually observed. According to Nuho¼glu Soysal and Strang (1989),
while France introduced compulsory education only in 1882, the primary enrollment ratio was
already 75 percent in 1870 (p. 278), the highest amongst developed countries. However, there
were big cross-regional di¤erences in school attendance (Weber, 1976). In the 1880s, schooling
became free, French was made the only language of instruction (Chervel, 1992) and village
teachers, trained to greater competence and new self-respect, became the licensed represen-
tatives of the Republic (Weber, 1976, p. 318). Parallel to this, parents started to perceive
that numeracy and literacy were actually useful (as e.g. they were required to get jobs both in
the public and the private sector), attendance increased, and di¤erences in attendance across
regions started to decline (Weber, 1976). At the same time, in Webers (1976, p. 332) words,
the greater function of the modern school (is) to teach not so much useful skills as a new patri-
otism beyond the limits naturally acknowledged by its charges. The revolutionaries of 1789 had
replaced old terms like schoolmaster, regent, and rector, with instituteur, because the teacher
was intended to institute the nation. The successful implementation of the schooling system
throughout the country constituted a wide-ranging process of standardization that helped
create and reinforce French unity, while contributing to the disintegration of rival allegiances
(Weber, p. 338).29
In the case of Spain, the two regions can be identied as the industrializing periphery
(Catalonia and the Basque Country) and as the agricultural centrewhich comprises the rest
of the country. According to historians, the bourgeoisie was dominant in the periphery, while
the landowning elite from the centre dominated Spanish politics (see e.g. Linz, 1974; Solé Tura,
1989; or Harrison, 1990).30 In our model, the case where the landowners are dominant at the
country level and the bourgeoisie is dominant at the regional level is studied in Proposition 4.
In this Proposition, secession arises as an equilibrium outcome when the industrialization shock
is weak and is more likely to arise when the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small.31 While
we cannot directly observe the size of the industrialization shock, Keating (1993) and Balfour
(1995) argue that the Catalan textile industry was uncompetitive by European standards, and
required for this reason a protected market for its goods (Spain) and a protected source of raw
materials (cotton from Cuba). Assuming that the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small at the
29Weber (1976, p. 336) also argues that Teachers taught or were expected to teach not just for the love
of art or science...but for the love of France a France whose creed had to be inculcated in all unbelievers. A
Catholic God, particularist and only identied with the fatherland by revisionists after the turn of the centurym
was replaced by a secular God: the fatherland and its living symbols, the army and the ag. Catechism was
replaced by civics lessons. Biblical history, proscribed in secular schools, was replaced by the sainted history of
France.
30Harrison (1976, p. 902) argues for instance that the agrarian and nancial interests of central and southern
Spain [who] made up the political oligarchy.
31Observe that secession is possible in more cases when 2 > HU = (1  ) (2   1 + )B which is easier to
satify the smaller B.
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Spanish level seems reasonable, given the very limited development of industries in the rest of
the country, as underlined by the literature on the failure of the industrial revolution in Spain
during the 19th century (see Nadal, 1973).
As predicted by the model, the development of the education system was weak in Spain
and peripheral nationalisms developed, although secession was not observed. Indeed, while
education became compulsory already in 1838, the primary enrollment ratio in 1870 was only
of 42 percent (Nuho¼glu Soysal and Strang, 1989, p. 278) and [c]entral government funding for
primary education remained minimal: between 1850 and 1875 education never accounted for
more than 1.13 percent of the budget and by the 1870s it had fallen to 0.55 percent(Shubert,
1990, p. 182). The illiteracy rate was 71 percent in 1870 and still 50 percent in 1910, against
respectively 32 and 13 percent in France in the same dates (Tortella, 2000, p. 13). In addition,
Shubert (1990, p. 183) argues that the war against non-o¢ cial languages in Spain was much
less successful in Spain than in France (...) One reason for this was that the Spanish state was
much less e¤ective in creating the basic agent of linguistic uniformity: the schools.
As for the development of Catalan nationalism, Linz (1974) argues that a regionalist move-
ment started in Catalonia in the mid 19th century and turned into a nationalist movement at
the end of the century. In addition to the cultural and literary revival of the Catalan language,
it was the defense of the interests of the national bourgeoisie that activated manufacturers
to create interest groups, organize meetings, write petitions, and contribute decisively to the
founding of the Lliga de Catalunya in 1887(p. 62) one of the rst Catalanist parties. How-
ever, the minority character of the industrial bourgeoisie of Catalonia, and later the Basque
country, in the total Spanish social structure, and the impossibility for it to gain power at the
center within the oligarchic liberal democracy of the Restoration [1870-1931], turned it away
from the struggle for power in the Spanish state. Instead it aimed to secure power at the local
and regional level and to build up support on the basis of cultural nationalism to bargain more
e¤ectively with the central government on economic issues particularly protectionism(Linz,
1975, pp. 384-386). Two examples of conicts between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the centres
landowning elite are the ght over tari¤s after Cubas independence in 1898 -with the Catalan
bourgeoisie defending the elimination of tari¤s on foreign grain and the imposition of tari¤s on
foreign textiles (see Harrison, 1990, or Díez Medrano, 1994)- and over the taxation of industrial
prots during World War I (see e.g. Carr, 1980 or Enrlich, 1998). Moreover, the programme
of the Catalan employers group Fomento del Trabajo Nacional set up following Cubas in-
dependence stressed the implementation of technical education as one of four main demands
(Harrison, 1974) which indicates that they valued schooling. Finally, referring to the end of
the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, Balcells (2013) argues that Catalan nationalism
exists and is salient in Spain because people were never massively educated under a strong a
well-organized Spanish state(p. 468).
9 Conclusion
This paper presents a Gellnerian model of industrialization and nation building emphasizing the
key role of elites in shaping that process. As in Gellner (1964, 1983), the central link between
industrialization and nation building goes through the double role of schooling as productivity
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enhancer and generator of a common identity. In addition, as in more recent contributions
to the nation building literature (see in particular Breuilly, 1993; Roeder, 2007; Kroneberg
and Wimmer, 2012), the observed outcome in terms of industrialization and nation building
crucially depends on the nature of the interaction between elite groups with di¤erent (and
sometimes diverging) interests.
In our two-region model, nation building through a unied educational system which brings
a common identity to both regions is assumed to be superior to regional organizations of
education because it expands output by enabling inter-regional production. However, this rst
best outcome is not always reached at equilibrium if the regionally-dominant elite is dominated
at the country level. The intuition for this result is as follows: an elite which is dominant
at both geographical levels can appropriate a large share of the cake at both levels, and thus
goes for the implementation of institutions at the level where the cake is the largest, i.e. the
country level. Instead, a regionally-dominant but countrywide-dominated elite may prefer a
large share of the small (regional) cake rather than a small share of the large cake stemming
from nation-building. If the bourgeoisie is the regionally-dominant group, regional schooling
through secession can actually be a second best when the milder interest for education of the
countrywide-dominant landowners lead them not to embark in nation building.
As a historical check, we study the ability of the model to explain the divergent evolution of
France and Spain in terms of nation-building and industrialization, despite their similar levels
of income and linguistic diversity at the beginning of the 19th century. In France the bour-
geoisie was dominant both at the country level and in the industrializing North-East; therefore
according to our model we should expect nation-building. Instead the model predicts the ab-
sence of nation-building in Spain given that the peripheral (Catalan and Basque) bourgeoisie
was only dominant at the regional level and the industrialization shock was not very large.
Indeed, France experienced the systematic implementation of free primary education across the
country since the 1880s, while Spain was still experiencing a 50% illiteracy rate in 1910. This
very di¤erent investments in education ran parallel to the much higher growth and stronger
national identity in France than in Spain.
While our model nds empirical backing in the comparative analysis of Spain versus France,
our paper does not perform an econometric test of Gellners theory. A important rst step in
this direction is Wimmer and Fenstein (2012) which uses a quantitative event history analysis,
and nds a positive but statistically insignicant- correlation between the length of railway
tracks thought of as a measure of nation-building through industrialization- and the birth
of nation-states. A further step in this direction which is beyond the scope of this paper and
requires an important data collection e¤ort would ideally link educational investments during
industrialization and the presence of national identities -whether or not taking the form of an
independent state.
A Cuto¤s and educational costs for the elite
Let e (resp.  e) denote the dominant (resp. dominated) group and E (resp.  E) its size.
Then, educational costs are split as follows:
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 For very high productivity shocks,  > max
h
ke ; bk ei, Ike = 0, and schooling is entirely
nanced by the dominated group. Under unied schooling, each member of the dominated
group pays M E since the masses of both regions get educated. Under region-i schooling,
the cost reduces to M
2( E) .
 If max
h
ke ; bk ei = bk e,
 then for max
heke ; k ei <  < bk e, the dominant group has to conance education
paying eIke while the dominated group pays Ik e: The value of eIke for the di¤erent
systems is fIUe = M IU e( E)E and fIRie = M2  IRi e( E)E .
 if max
heke ; k ei = k e and max hk e; bkei = k e, then for bke <  < k e, the
dominant group wants education, but the dominated group is made worse o¤ with
education, so the dominant group fully pays the educational costs, namely M
E
under
unied schooling and M
2E
under region-i schooling.
 In all other cases, the dominant group has no interest in implementing schooling.
Table 1 reports the values of the productivity thresholds and associated payments under
unied schooling, region-i education and region-i secession.32 In order to calculate the thresh-
olds under secession, we take into account that in that case educational costs are paid only by
the elites of the seceding region.
Unied education Region-i education Region-i secession
kN
1

kB
1 
2
1
bkN 2(1 )N + 1bkB 2 (1 )B(2 1+)2(1 )B + 1 1 (1 )Bi( 1)(1 )Bi + 1eke 2 (1 )B(2 1+)(1 )(N+2B) + 1 2 (1 )2Bi( 1)(1 )(N+2Bi) + 1
IkN
( 1)(1 )M
2
( 1)(1 )M
4
(1 )( 1)M
2
IkB
(1 )[2 1+]M
2
( 1)(1 )BiM
2B
(1 )( 1)M
2fIkN 2 B(1 )(2 1+)2N M 1 ( 1)(1 )BiN M2 1 Bi(1 )( 1)N MfIkB 2 N(1 )( 1)2B M 2 ( 1)(1 )NB M4 2 N(1 )( 1)4Bi M .
Table 1: Productivity thresholds
32For the time being we ignore nonnegativity constraints on Ike when calculating
fIke and fke . This approach
has the advantage that fke = fkB = fkN for all schooling systems k, but, as it might lead to unnatural rankings of
the cuto¤s, in particular to ckB < fkB = fkN < kN when Hk > 2: This is of no importance, since fke is irrelevant
in these cases and we therefore write this case as ckB < kN only as in part 2 of Lemma 1.
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B School attendance by the masses
Proof of Lemma 2 The minimum productivity shocks for the masses to be willing to be
schooled are UM1 (given by (15)) for unied schooling and 
Ri
Mi
(given by (16)) for regional
schooling. The relevant cuto¤s for the elite are ekB = ekN when Hk < 2, and kN for the
landowners and bkB for the bourgeoisie when Hk > 2. We now show that in all cases these
cuto¤s are bigger than the cuto¤ of the masses to be willing to get schooled. In particular:
(i) UM1 < eUe always holds given that UM1 < eUe , (1 + ) (B1  B2) (1   ) < 2, and the
second inequality always holds. (ii) UM1 < bUB always holds given that UM1 < bUB , 0 <
2N
(1 )B +2
h
2
1    1 + 2(1 + )B2
i
+(1  )N , and the RHS of the second inequality is always
positive. (iii) UM1 < 
U
N holds (trivial). (iv) 
Ri
Mi
< RiN (trivial); (v) 
Ri
Mi
< eRie holds (trivial);
(vi) RiMi < bRiB always holds as RiMi < bRiB , 0 < NBi(1 ) + (2 N)1  +N + N1  , and the RHS of
the second inequality is always positive. 
C Unied versus regional schooling
Proof of Lemma 3 A dominant bourgeoisie prefers R1 to R2 whenever R1B > 
R2
B , i.e.,
IR2B   IR1B > (1  ) ((1  )) (B1  B2))
M
2B
.
For  > bR1N = bR2N , we have IR2B = IR1B = 0 and R1 is preferred if  > 1 , which always holds.
The same condition holds for copayment under both systems since fIR1B = fIR2B : If HR2 < 2 these
are the only relevant comparisons. For HR2 > 2 the bourgeoisie fully nances education in
each region when bR2B <  < R2N but the cost is the same in each region and R1 is preferred as
 > 1

always holds. For eR1B <  < eR2B again R1 is preferred since fIR1B < cIR2B = M2B .
We next consider dominant landowners. A dominant landowner prefers R1 to R2 whenever
IR2N > I
R1
N . Since H
R1 > HR2, the following schooling costs are possible when schooling is
implementable in both regions: (i) for  > bR2B schooling is free under both systems sincebR1B < bR2B , and thus landowners are indi¤erent; (ii) for bR1B <  < bR2B , IR1N = 0 and fIR2N and
hence R1 is preferred; (iii) for eR2 <  < bR1B , the costs are respectively fIR1N and fIR2N . AsfIR1N < fIR2N , R1 is preferred in this case too. 
Proof of Lemma 4 Dominant landowners prefer U whenever UN > 
Ri
N , i.e.,
(1  ) (   1)M
4
> IUN   IRiN . (29)
The LHS is always positive since the minimum productivity shock for which the landowners are
willing to implement U without paying anything is UN =
1

. When landowners can implement
U at no cost (i.e. for  > bUB), U is always preferred as (1 ) (   1) M4 >  IRiN always holds.
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In addition, since bUB < bRiB always holds, schooling at no cost for landowners arises rst under
U than under Ri. It then only remains to check whether (29) also holds if there is copayment
under both systems, i.e. for fIUN and fIRiN , which can only occur if HU < 2.33 (29) becomes
 > g =
2 + (1  ) (N + 2B (1  )  2Bi)
(1  ) (N + 4B  2Bi) .
Since eUe < eRie is always satised, copayment in both systems is only possible for  > eRie . As
it is easy to show that eRie > g ,  > g always holds in this case and thus UN > RiN holds
also in the case of copayment.
Consider in turn the case of a dominant bourgeoisie. A dominant bourgeoisie prefers U
whenever UB > 
Ri
B , i.e.,
(1  ) (B  B i +  (2B  Bi)) M
2B
> IUB   IRiB . (30)
The LHS is positive for  > B i B
(2B Bi) which is clearly smaller than 
Ri
B =
1

. Hence when
education is free for the bourgeoisie under both systems, namely for  > bUN = bRiNi, U is
preferred. It remains to check what happens under copayment by the bourgeoisie. In this case,
U is preferred for UB(
fIUB ) > RiB (fIRiB ) or equivalently for
 > gg =
2 + (1  ) (N   2 (B  B i))
(1  ) (N + 2 (2B  Bi))
with gg < eUe since 2+(1 )(N 2(B B i))(1 )(N+2(2B Bi)) < 2+(1 )(1 B)(1 )(N+2B) given that the LHS has a smaller
numerator and a bigger denominator than the RHS. As eUe < eRie ; U with copayment is always
preferred to Ri with copayment by a dominant bourgeoisie. Now if HRi > 2 the bourgeoisie
fully nances education in both systems when bRiB <  < eUB. Then condition (30) becomes
 >
1  (1  ) (B  B i)
(1  ) (2B  Bi)
which is smaller than bRiB since  (1   )Bi (B   Bi  B i + 2B) < 2B i (notice that the
LHS is negative). Hence U is preferred. Now if HRi > 2 then for eUB <  < eRie the bourgeoisie
fully nances regional education but only co-nances it under U , which is clearly better than
fully nancing it, so U is preferred. 
D Secession versus unied education
In order to study the incentives of the elite to choose between secession and unied education,
we rst need to rank the productivity cuto¤s under the two systems. This is done in Lemma 5
noting that HSi < HU .
33Observe that HR2 < HR1 < HU . This gives rise to three cases: (i) HU < 2, (ii) HR1 < 2 < HU and (iii)
HR2 < 2 < HR1 .
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Lemma 5 1. For 2 > HU then we have either
 N < eUN = eUB < eSiBi = eSiNi < min bSiNi = bUN ; bUB < bSiBi or
 N < eUN = eUB < bUB < eSiBi = eSiNi < min[bSiNi = bUN ; bSiBi ]
2. For HSi < 2 < HU the ranking of the thresholds is bUB < eUN = eUB < N < eSiBi = eSiNi <
min[bSiNi = bUN ; bSiBi ]
3. For 2 < HSi all thresholds but bSiNi = bUN are smaller than N .
Proof. The three parameter areas follow from Lemma 1 using HSi < HU . The ordering of the
thresholds is based on the following comparisons which mainly use simple algebra (i) bUN = bSiNi ;
(ii) eUN = eUB < eSiBi = eSiNi always by simple algebra; (iii) bUB < bSiBi always holds given that bUB <bSiBi ,  (1   )BBi (1 + ) < 2B i and the second inequality is always veried; (iv) bSiNi >bSiBi , (1  )NBi(  1) > N   2Bi; (v) bSiNi < bUB , (1  )BN (2  1 + ) < 2N   4B;
(vi) bUB > eSiei , 2(N   2B i) > (1   )B ((2  1 + ) (2Bi +N)  4Bi (  1)); (vii)bSiNi > eSiNi always; (viii) If bSiNi < bUB then bUB > eSiei (by point vii).
D.1 Same dominant group at the regional and country level
Proof of Proposition 2 Lemma 5 helps us establishing which payment congurations si-
multaneously arise under U and Si:
(i) For  > bSiNi = bUN , a dominant bourgeoisie gets schooling for free under both systems.
Imposing IUB = I
Si
Bi
= 0 in (22), secession is chosen if 0 > (1 )(1+)M
2
, which never holds.
(ii) Next, whenever max(eSiBi,N) <  < bSiNi = bUN , there is copayment under both systems.
In that case, fIUB   fISiBi = (2 N(1  )(   1))Bi  B i4BBi

M .
Then, as (2 N(1  )(   1)) > 0 for  < bSiNi = bUN we have that fIUB   fISiBi < 0 for i = 2
since B1 > B2 and hence U is always preferred to S2 as the payo¤ (resp. the cost) of schooling
is higher (resp. lower) under U . We will now show that condition (22) is also violated with
copayment for S1. Assume by contradiction that condition (22) holds. This would require:
(2 N(1  )(   1)) (B1  B2)
4BB1
M > (1 + )(1  )M
2
which can be rewritten as
 < s =
2 (B1  B2) + (1  ) (N (B1  B2)  2BB1)
(1  ) (2BB1 +N (B1  B2)) .
However, as eS1N1 > s by simple algebra this is incompatible with the bourgeoisie being willing
to pay for the additional cost of education.
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(iii) For bSiB ; <  < N (which can only hold for HSi > 2), landowners are not willing to
contribute to the cost of education, but it is still protable for the bourgeois under both systems
to implement education bearing its full cost. Then, in that case, fIUB = MB and fISiBi = M2Bi and
condition (22) becomes
Bi  B i > (1 + )(1  )BBi,
which can never hold for i = 2. For i = 1 the condition is equivalent to  < ss 
B1 B2 (1 )BB1
(1 )BB1 and simple calculus reveals that ss < bS1B1, where bS1B1 is the cuto¤ for the
bourgeoisie to be willing to fully pay education under S1. Hence condition (22) is violated.
(iv) Finally, for lower values of  (specically, eUB <  < eSiBi for HSi < HU < 2, bUB <  <eSiBi for HSi < 2 < HU , and bUB <  < bSiBi for HSi < HU < 2) education is implemented only
under U , and thus U is always preferred. 
Proof of Proposition 3 We need to show that IUN  ISiNi. By lemma 5, dominant landowners
either get education for free under both systems for  > bSiBi or have to copay under Si but get
education for free under U (i.e. 0 = IUN  gISiNi) or have to copay under both systems. It remains
to prove that fIUN < fISiNi which can be rewritten as 2B i+B > B i Bi: It is immediate to
see that this holds for S1. For S2, the required cuto¤ is  > l = B1 B2 B2B1 but l < N , hence
this is always true. 
D.2 Di¤erent dominant group at the regional and country level
D.2.1 Regionally-dominant but countrywide-dominated bourgeoisie
The complete statement of Proposition 4 is:
The preferences of the bourgeoisie are as follows
1. For 2 < HSi the bourgeoisie always prefers being dominated under unied schooling over
being dominant under secession. However, for bSiBi < N unied schooling is not imple-
mented with dominant landowners and the bourgeoisie prefers secession with schooling.
2. ForHSi < 2 < HU the bourgeoisie always prefers being dominated under unied schooling
over being dominant under secession if Bi > N2 . If Bi <
N
2
and max[aa;bSiNi ] = bSiNi then
the bourgeoisie prefers secession for aa <  < a:
3. Let 2 > HU :
(a) If the region-2 bourgeoisie is dominant, then secession will never occur for B2 > N2 .
If B2 < N2 , secession might occur for intermediate values of . Specically,
i. for eS2B2 > bUB and min[aa; a] = a, secession is never preferred
ii. for eS2B2 > bUB and min[aa; a] = aa, secession is preferred for aa <  < a :
iii. for eS2B2 < bUB, secession is preferred for eS2B2 <  < a.
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(b) If the region-1 bourgeoisie is dominant, then secession might occur for intermediate
values of : More precisely
i. if B1 > N2 then secession is never preferred if eSiBi > bUB but if eSiBi < bUB then
secession is preferred for eSiBi <  < min[a; aa]
ii. if B1 < N2 , eS1B1 > bUB and min[aa; a] = a, then secession is never preferred
iii. if B1 < N2 , eS1B1 > bUB and min[aa; a] = aa, then secession is preferred for
aa <  < a
iv. if B1 < N2 and eS1B1 < bUB, then secession is preferred for eS1B1 <  < a.
where
a =
2  (1  )B
(1  )B (31)
is such that UB
 
IUB =
M
B

= SBi(I
Si
Bi
= 0) while
aa =
2 (Bi  B i)  (1  )B (N + 2Bi)
(1  )B (2Bi  N) (32)
is such that UB
 
IUB =
M
B

= SBi(I
Si
Bi
= fISiBi):
Proof of Proposition 4 The bourgeoisie prefers Si to U whenever condition (22) holds,
namely
IUB   ISiBi > (1 + )(1  )
M
2
. (22)
The exact value of IUB and I
Si
Bi
depends on the identity of the dominant group, the size of the
shock, and the underlying parameters.
The following payment constellation may occur:
1.  > max
 bSiNi ; bUB: from Fig. 3 and 4, if education is implemented under U , the dom-
inated bourgeoisie pays IUB =
M
B
and from Fig. 1 and 2, education for the dominant
bourgeoisie is free under secession (ISiBi = 0). From (22), secession is preferred if and only
if  < a with a as dened in (31).
2. min[bSiNi ; bUB] <  < max[bSiNi ; bUB]: we have to distinguish two subcases:
(a) If min[bSiNi ; bUB] = bSiNi, then IUB = IUB and ISiBi = 0: In this case, Si is always preferred
because condition (22) reduces to  > SiBi =
1

, which is always satised as this is
the condition for the bourgeoisie to be willing to implement free education under Si.
(b) If min[bSiNi ; bUB] = bUB, then IUB = MB and ISiBi = fISiBi : The condition that Si is preferred
becomes
< aa1= aa=
2 (Bi B i) (1  )B (N + 2Bi)
(1  )B (2Bi N)
for 2Bi> N (33)
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> aa2= aa=
(1  )B (N + 2Bi)  2 (Bi  B i)
(1  )B (N   2Bi) for 2Bi< N (34)
3. For eSiBi <  < max [bSiNi ; bUB], IUB = IUB and ISiBi = fISiBi. Secession is always preferred in this
area since condition (22) reduces to  > eSiBi which is the condition for the bourgeoisie to
be willing to go for copayment under Si.
We need to check under which conditions the cuto¤s (31), (33) and (34) are relevant cuto¤s.
Both a and aa1 are upper bounds. Therefore a is not relevant if a < max[bSiNi ; bUB]. Similarly,
aa1 is not relevant for aa1 < max[eSiBi ; bUB]. Since aa2 is a lower bound it is not relevant for
aa2 > bSiNi. Lemma 6 tells us under which conditions these cuto¤s are relevant and how they
relate to each other and to the di¤erent payment areas. 
Lemma 6 1. a > bUB always.
2. a < bSiNi , aa2 > bSiNi , a < aa2.
3. aa1 < bSiNi , aa1 < a , a < bSiNi :
4. eSiBi > bUB , aa1 < eSiBi , aa1 < bUB.
5. For 2B2 > N , a < bS2N2 and aa1 < N and aa1 < eS2B2 always:
6. aa2 < eSiNi , eSiNi < bUB , aa2 < bUB.
7. min[bSiNi ; bUB] = bSiNi ) a > max[bSiNi ; bUB].
Proof.
1. bUB = 2 (1 )B(2 1+)2(1 )B + 1 < a = 2 (1 )B(+)(1 )B + 1 can be rewritten as (1 )B ( + 1) < 2
which is always true.
2. Simple algebra reveals that a < bSiNi , aa2 > bSiNi ,
NB(1  ) (+ ) > 2(N   B): (35)
3. Simple algebra reveals that aa1 < bSiNi , aa1 < a , a < bSiNi , condition (35) holds.
4. Simple algebra reveals that eSiBi > bUB , aa1 < eSiBi , aa1 < bUB ,
(1  )B (N (2  (1  )) + 2Bi (1 + )) > 2N   4B i (36)
5. From the proof of Proposition 4, aa1 is the relevant threshold for region-2 secession for
2B2 > N . It is easy to see that (35) always holds in this case. Hence by point 3
in this Lemma it follows that a < bSN2 always holds for this parameter space. Next
aa1 < N =
1

, (Bi  B i) < (1 )BBi (+ ) which is always true for Bi < B i and
hence it is always true for secession in region 2. Similarly, 2B2 > N , 2N   4B2 < 0
and thus also 2N   4B1 < 0 given that B1 > B2. Then, the RHS of (36) is negative for
region-2 secession, which from (36) implies that aa1 < eSiBi holds for region-2 secession.
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6. Simple algebra reveals that aa2 < eSiNi , eSiNi < bUB , aa2 < bUB ,
(1  )B (N (2  (1  )) + 2Bi (1 + )) < 2N   4B i: (37)
7. If min[bSiNi ; bUB] = bSiNi then a > max[bSiNi ; bUB] since by point 1 a > bUB.
We are now set to prove proposition 4. In general, the results follow by combining the
parameter restriction and the resulting ranking of the cuto¤s with the insights derived from
Lemma 6. Here are the details.
1. We look at the parameter area where 2 > HU . Given eUB < eSiBi it immediately follows
that U is preferred for low , namely eUN = eUB <  < eSiBi = eSiNi.
(a) Let Bi > N2 . For i = 2 by point 5 of Lemma 6 neither aa1nor a are relevant cuto¤s
and therefore Si is never preferred. In turn, for i = 1 we have to distinguish two
further cases: (i) if eSiBi > bBU by point 4 of Lemma 6 aa1 < eSiBi and therefore aa1
is not a relevant cuto¤. Moreover, since eSiBi < bSiNi always by point 3 of Lemma 6,
a is not a relevant cuto¤ either and Si is never preferred; (ii) If eSiBi < bBU by point
4 of Lemma 6 aa1 might be a relevant cuto¤. By point 3 of Lemma 6 the relevant
cuto¤ is min[aa1 ; a]. Notice that a is always relevant by point 7 of Lemma 6 if
min[bSiNi ; bUB] = bSiNi :
(b) Let Bi < N2 : Again we need to distinguish two cases: (i) If eSiBi > bBU , then by point
6 of Lemma 6 aa2 > bBU . By point 2 of Lemma 6 if min[aa2 ; a] = a, then Si
is never preferred, but if min[aa2 ; a] = aa2 then both cuto¤s are relevant and
Si is preferred for aa2 <  < a: In turn, (ii) if eSiBi < bBU by point 6 of Lemma 6
aa2 < eSiBi and hence the lower bound for secession becomes eSiBi : Also aa2 < bBU and
by point 2 of Lemma 6 aa2 < bSiNi, so a is the relevant upper bound for secession.
2. We now look at the parameter area whereHSi < 2 < HU . In this parameter constellation,
the bourgeoisie always fully nances education under U . Since bUB < eSiBi by point 4 of
lemma 6, the cuto¤ aa1 is never relevant given that aa1 < eSiBi. From point 4, we also
know that aa1 < bUB holds. For 2Bi > N , bSiNi > bSiBi. As bSiBi > bUB, then bSiNi > bUB.
Combining this with bUB > aa1, we get that bSiNi > aa1 and thus from point 3, bSiNi > a,
and hence a is not a relevant cuto¤ and U is always preferred. Consider instead now
the case with 2Bi < N . As bUB < eSiBi = eSN , from point 6 of lemma 6, we know
that aa2 > bUB and aa2 > eSiBi. Thus secession with education partly nanced by the
bourgeoisie is possible if and only if aa2 < bSiNi. Note that a is dened as the point of
intersection of
UB

IUB =
M
B

=  M
B
(1  (1  )B) +M(1  ) (38)
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SBi
 
ISiBi = 0

= (1  )M
2
+ (1  )M
2
: (39)
It is easy to check that the intercept of (39) is larger than the intercept of (38) and that
its slope with respect to  is half the slope of (38). In turn, aa1 and aa2 correspond to
the point of intersection of UB(I
U
B =
M
B
) with
SBi

ISiBi=
fISiBi=   M4Bi (2  (1  ) (2Bi  N))+(1  ) (2Bi+N) M4Bi  (40)
for respectively 2Bi > N and 2Bi < N . In addition, the slope of (40) is smaller than
the slope of (38) if and only if 2Bi > N . The intercept of (40) is always smaller than the
intercept of (38) for S2. This is also true as long as aa2 is positive for S1.
34 Therefore we
have aa2 < a for 2B2 < N . Then, from point 2, we also have that aa2 < bSiNi and bSiNi
< a, which implies that S2 is chosen by the bourgeoisie for 2B2 < N if aa2 <  < a.
3. Finally, we study the parameter area HSi > 2. In this case bUB < N < bSiNi always
holds and hence the bourgeoisie always fully nances education under U . We also haveeSiBi < N , so that the bourgeoisie is always willing to go for copayment for N <  < bSiNi
and will get education for free for  > bSiNi. In this parameter area, eSiBi > bUB always holds.
Then by point 4 (rep. point 3) of lemma 6 aa1 < eSiBi (resp. a < bSiNi) which implies that
aa1 (resp. a) is never a relevant cuto¤and that U is always preferred. Now, by point 6 of
lemma 6 aa2 > bUB. Can it be the case that secession is preferred for aa2 <  < a? From
(34), the cuto¤aa2 might only be relevant if 2Bi < N . Note that this can be rewritten as
2Bi+B < 1. The parameter area we are studying requires HSi = 2(1 )( 1)Bi > 2:
Combining both conditions requires 2Bi +B < (1  )(  1)Bi which is equivalent to
(2  (1  )(  1))Bi + B < 0 which is clearly false. Hence aa2 cannot be a relevant
cuto¤ when HSi > 2. So U is always preferred when it is implementable. However,
education under Si is implemented by the bourgeoisie before education under U , namely
for bSiBi <  < N . For these parameter values, the dominant bourgeoisie in region i
prefers Si to being dominated by landowners with no schooling under U . 
D.2.2 Regionally-dominant but countrywide-dominated landowners
Proof of Proposition 5 If landowners are dominant in region i but dominated at the country
level, they prefer secession whenever IUN > I
S
Ni
. The following educational costs are possible
 For 2 > HU , there are two possible rankings of the cuto¤s:
1. eUN < eSiNi < bUN < bSiBi (Lemma 5). For  > bSiBi education is free under Si but has to
be paid fully under U , so Si is preferred. For bUN <  < bSiBi, under U , N landowners
pay full education costs forM mass members, while under Si there is copayment and
thus N=2 landowners pay less than the full cost for M=2 mass members implying
that ISNi < I
U
N and thus Si is preferred. Next, for eSiNi <  < bUN landowners pay their
34But the opposite holds if aa2 is negative.
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maximum willingness IUN =
( 1)(1 )M
2
under U and copay fISiNi = 1 Bi(1 )( 1)N M
under Si. As it can be shown that IUN > I
S
Ni
,  > eSiNi, Si is also preferred by the
landowners whenever  > eSiNi, i.e., whenever it is implementable. For eUN <  < eSiNi,
education is only implemented under U , and thus the landowners prefer U in that
case.
2. eUN < eSiNi < bSiBi < bUN (Lemma 5): For  > bSiBi, education is free under Si but
the landowners either pay their maximal willingness or the entire education under
U , so Si is preferred. For eSiNi <  < bUN , landowners pay their maximum willingness
IUN =
( 1)(1 )M
2
under U and copay fISiNi = 1 Bi(1 )( 1)N M under Si and IUN > ISNi
whenever  > eSiNi. Finally, for eUN <  < eSiNi, education is only implemented under
U , and thus the landowners prefer U in that case.
 For HSi < 2 < HU , eUN < N < eSiNi < min[bUN ; bSiBi ] holds (Lemma 5). If min[bUN ; bSiBi ] =bUN , then we have the same cases as for 2 > HU and secession is always preferred (for
 > eSiNi ) when it is implementable. If min[bUN ; bSiBi ] = bSiBi then for  > bSiBi education is
free under Si and the landowners have to pay their maximal willingness (and later even
the entire education) under U , so Si is preferred. For eSiNi <  < bSiBi, there is copayment
under Si while the landowners have to pay their maximal willingness under U , and we
have shown that Si is preferred for  > eSiNi. Hence also here Si is always preferred when
it is implementable.
 For HSi > 2, landowners get education under Si for free, so it is always preferred when it
is implementable. 
E Welfare analysis
E.1 Proof of Proposition 7
R1 is preferred to U by the social planner if and only if 1 + B2 + N2 + 
 
1 + 
 
B1 +
N
2

>
2
 
(1 + )N
2
+ (1 + )B

, which is equivalent to  < z  1+(
N
2
+B2) B
(N2 +(B2+B))
. However, it is easy
to show that z < 
R1S1
W which means that R1 is preferred to U only when the social planner
prefers no education to R1, and thus the implementation of R1 is never a rst best outcome.
The same applies to R2 as 
R1S1
W < 
R2S2
W . Finally, regional schooling with schooling in both
regions is dominated by U given that the cost of both systems is the same and only U generates
cross-regional matches. 
E.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We rst show that when HU < 2, U results in undereducation for UW    eUe . Indeed,
for HU < 2, the threshold under U is always eUe no matter the identity of the dominant
group, and it is easy to show that UW < eUe always holds. Next we consider the case where
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HU > 2. When the landowners are dominant, the relevant cuto¤ for education is N . As HU 
(1  )B (2+    1) > 2 implies that B (2+    1) > 2 and it can be shown that UW <
1

= N , B (2+    1) > 2, then UW < N holds in this case, and there is undereducation
for UW    N . If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant, the relevant cuto¤ is bUB: It is easy
to show that UW > bUB , HU > 2 + 4BN . Thus, for HU < 2 + 4BN , UW < bUB and there is
undereducation for UW <  < bUB, and instead for HU < 2 + 4BN , UW > bUB holds and there is
overeducation for bUB <  < UW . 
E.3 E¢ ciency of Region-1 Secession
Figure A1 studies the optimality of schooling under S1 when the bourgeoisie is dominant and
 = 0:1,  = 0:95, B1 = 0:45, B = 0:5, andM = 2 The dashed line represents the threshold for
the implementation of education under S1 for a dominant bourgeoisie (given by bS1B as for these
parameter values HS1 > 2), while the solid line represents the socially-e¢ cient productivity
threshold (R1S1W ).
As for U , the e¢ cient no-education (resp. education) decision is taken in region I (resp.
region IV), while there is undereducation in region II and overeducation in region III.
E.4 Proof of Proposition 8
From Proposition 4, U cannot be implemented but Si can for HSi > 2 and bSiBi <  < N . As
HSi > 2, bSiBi < N , (1  )(  1)Bi > 1, then we know that RiSiW < N , (  1)Bi > 1
necessarily holds here. As Si is preferred to no education whenever  > 
RiSi
W , Si is optimal
and implementable for max[RiSiW ; bSiBi ] <  < N . 
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E.5 Numerical examples of overprovision and underprovision of se-
cession by a regional dominant but countrywide dominated bour-
geoisie
Example 1 For  = 0:1, N = 0:3; B1 = 0:5,  = 0:9 and  = 3:5 we have RiSiW = 0:964912 <bSiBi = 1; 02293 < N = 1:1111. Implemented secession is socially optimal for bSiBi <  < N but
there is too little secession for RiSiW <  < bSiBi.
Example 2 For  = 0:05, N = 0:45; B1 = 0:5,  = 0:95 and  = 5 we have bSiBi = 0:65374 <
RiSiW = 0:666345 < N = 1:05263. Implemented secession is socially optimal for 
RiSi
W <  <
N but there is too much secession for bSiBi <  < RiSiW .
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